Monthly Context Report - February 2023
April 2022, Lviv, Ukraine. Svetlana (red vest) watches as her daughter Kristina, grandson Timur and granddaughter Sofia play nearby on the mat where the family sleeps. They fled the ongoing war in Ukraine, and are staying in this shelter in the center of Lviv. The building used to be a cultural center, but now offers 40 displaced Ukrainian women with children a safe place to stay. It is one of 350 shelters in Lviv. Some displaced women stay a few days and move on, while others have stayed for 2 months. People register at the railway station when they arrive in Lviv, and get directed to whichever shelter has space. Many of those who work in the shelter are refugees themselves.
Summary
Military developments: Throughout February, the intensified Russian ground offensive in eastern Ukraine did not lead to significant frontline changes, though both sides suffered severe losses. In the coming months, a Ukrainian counteroffensive is expected, likely in southern Ukraine.
Security and access: In the south, frontline communities faced regular shelling, whilst notable attacks continued in the northeast along the Ukrainian–Russian border. Critical energy infrastructure continued to be targeted and damaged, though power supply remained relatively stable throughout February. Humanitarian warehouses were shelled in Kherson and Donetsk oblasts in mid-February.
Political developments: The internal political reshuffle that started in January continued, with new officials with security backgrounds appointed to lead frontline and border regions and municipalities. Over the past two months, an anti-corruption campaign was triggered following increased pressure from Ukrainian civil society and Western partners.
International politics: Zelensky’s diplomatic visit to Europe and US President Biden’s visit to Kyiv confirmed ongoing critical Western military assistance. Separately, China proposed a peace plan commentators viewed as lacking an actionable plan for implementation.
Economic indicators: The National Bank of Ukraine’s inflation forecast for 2023 improved, indicating that the peak may be over. Meanwhile, unemployment is forecasted to be 26% for 2023. Currently, 40% of unemployed people are categorised as vulnerable.
Key economic sectors: The grain deal expires on 18 March, and prospects for extension are unclear. About 30 million tonnes of grain are still awaiting export, despite the harvest decreasing by more than one third since 2021.
Social: Integration of displaced people is an increasing priority, with trends indicating that most do not plan to return to their homes in the next few months.
Environment: Kakhovka Reservoir has dropped to its lowest level in 30 years, threatening to leave hundreds of thousands without water and affect the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant security.
Poland: Poland commits to significantly increase its army and military spending while deepening cooperation with the US and NATO. Political conflict between Warsaw and Minsk deepened, affecting cross-border movement.
Moldova: Moldova goes through political turmoil as government resigns and allegedly Kremlin-linked opposition takes people to the streets to protest high energy tariffs, stricter security measures, and the government’s support of Ukraine.
Security and access
Summary
A major Russian ground offensive, expected by Kyiv in January–February, has not resulted in any significant frontline changes. Both sides suffer severe losses daily.
A Ukrainian counteroffensive is expected to commence in the coming months, likely in the south.
Critical energy infrastructure continued to be targeted and damaged, though power supply remained relatively stable throughout February.
Both sides continue to actively engage drones to reach targets across enemy territory.
In the south, frontline communities faced regular shelling, whilst notable attacks also continued in the northeast along the Ukrainian–Russian border.
Humanitarian warehouses were shelled in Kherson and Donetsk oblasts.
Liberated (blue) and occupied areas (red, occupied before the full-scale invasion: black) as of 28 February 2023.
Source: Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project
Military developments
Russian offensive
A major Russian ground offensive, expected by Kyiv in January–February, has not resulted in any significant frontline changes. Intensified attacks started in late January from Kupiansk (Kharkiv oblast) in the northeast to Vuhledar (Donetsk oblast) in the southeast, allowing Russian troops to move several kilometers forward at maximum, with none of the main towns or cities taken.
The battle of Bakhmut, an epicenter of hostilities in Donetsk oblast, started on 1 August last year and has been already lasted longer than the Battle of Stalingrad. Observers believe that with the beginning of spring, warmer weather, and muddy season Russian troops will not be able to advance significantly.
Bakhmut front as of 28 February.
Source: militaryland.net
Both the Ukrainian army and Russian forces are suffering severe losses daily. Trench warfare with intense artillery fire and Russia’s human wave tactics are resulting in increasingly high casualties. In the biggest tank battle of this war, around Vuhledar, which Russian forces consider a strategic location between their northern and southern front, Ukrainian authorities reported Russian losses of up to 5,000 by mid-February.
BBC and Russian independent media Mediazona verified 15,136 names of killed Russian servicemen since February 2022, which exceeds official death toll of Soviet troops in Afghanistan in 10 years, although actual figures are likely much higher.
At the end of February Zelensky started cautiously conceding that Bakhmut would not be defended at all costs. Ukrainian army might be preparing for a retreat from the city to positions in vicinity, such as to Sloviansk, Kramatorsk and Kostiantynivka. Due to their proximity to the current frontline, these cities also faced attacks throughout February. Sloviansk and Kostiantynivka were shelled with missiles several times throughout the month. On the night of 1 to 2 February, a Russian Iskander missile struck a residential building in the centre of Kramatorsk, killing three people and injuring 21.
Expected Ukrainian counteroffensive
Ukraine’s international allies are expecting Ukraine’s next counteroffensive in the coming months, likely in the south. Since the last successful Ukrainian counteroffensives in November 2022 the frontline has barely moved, with Russia still controlling about 17% of Ukrainian territory as of February.
The aim of the Ukrainian counter-offensive is expected to be to cut through the Crimea–Donbas–Russia land corridor, according to deputy head of Ukrainian military intelligence Vadym Skibitskyi. He further stressed that the Ukrainian army could also hit Russian airfields or depots with missiles and artillery systems on Russian territory.
Energy infrastructure damage
Mass rocket attacks, the 14th since last fall, targeted mostly critical infrastructure, injuring two workers of DTEK, Ukraine’s largest private energy company. The low number of casualties stands in striking contrast to Russia’s previous wave of cruise missiles on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure on 26 January, which killed at least 11 civilians and left many without electricity, water or heat.
According to INSO’s report on 10 February, energy infrastructure was damaged in six oblasts, including hits at four of DTEK’s thermal power stations leading to power outages. The energy infrastructure in Khmelnytskyi Oblast and the frontline oblasts of Zaporizhzhia and Kharkiv were most affected. Despite the severe attacks, however, shortly after the last wave of missile attacks the energy supply stabilised across the country. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that day that they downed 61 out of the 71 missiles.
On 21 February, Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal announced that Ukraine did not face a power shortage in Ukraine’s energy system since 11 February. The energy supply stayed stable across most of the country until the rest of the month, with notable exceptions, for instance, in Odesa Oblast, where it resumed on 27 February.
Drone attacks
Both sides continue to actively engage drones to reach targets across enemy territory. During the night of 26-27 February, the Russian Federation attacked Ukraine from the north with 14 Iranian Shahed drones, with eleven shot down. On 10 February, the Ukrainian army reported the downing of Shahed-136 drones over Mykolaiv, Odesa and Kherson regions. In Odesa Oblast, the Russian army used for the first time an unmanned surface drone, damaging Zatoka bridge on 11 February. Russia also reportedly increasingly uses drones, missiles without explosives and small air balloons to identify and attack the Ukrainian air defence system.
Moscow blamed Ukraine for multiple drone attacks in southern and central Russia, including near Moscow, in late February, claiming some aimed at oil depots. Although most were shot down, some reached their targets or hit apartment buildings. The airspace around St Petersburg was briefly closed, reportedly due to risk of a drone attack. On 26 February, a Russian A-50 early warning and control aircraft was seriously damaged at the airfield outside of Belarus’ capital Minsk. Belarus partisans, supporting Ukraine, claimed they used drone for the attack. Kyiv denies having anything to do with any of the attacks.
Security and access
Shelling of humanitarian infrastructure
Humanitarian warehouse in Chasiv Yar run by Ukrainian NGO Proliska was shelled on 15 February — the third attack on humanitarian facilities within two days. Prior to that, on 14 February, humanitarian warehouses were shelled in Kherson city and in Kostiantynivka, Donetsk Oblast.
Attacks in the frontline and border regions
Notable attacks occurred along the Ukrainian–Russian border, particularly in Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts. On 12 February, Sumy regional military administration reported more than 50 Russian hits in the region. On 27 February, Russian forces shelled six communities across the oblast, including Bilopillia, Shalyhyne, Nova Sloboda, and Krasnopillia. Seven people were injured during a missile strike on 10 February in Kharkiv District and two were injured during a missile strike in Kharkiv city centre in the morning hours of 22 February.
Vovchansk community, at the very border of Kharkiv Oblast with Russia, was regularly shelled, and an attack on 6 February led to a huge fire at a local medical facility. The 16,000 people remaining in Kupiansk community experienced daily shelling throughout February.
By the beginning of February 2023, Russia's border regions have been shelled at least 350 times. 36 people died, according to Russian independent media.
Zaporizhzhia front as of 28 February.
Source: militaryland.net
In the south, frontline communities were under continued regular shelling in the direction of Huliaipole in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast, as well as Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, and Mykolaiv oblasts. The Russian attack on a bus stop in Kherson on 21 February killed six and injured at least 12 people. On 25 and 27 February Russian forces struck Nikopol district and the town of Marhanets in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, with heavy artillery, damaging houses, cars, and critical infrastructure.
On 9 February, the Russian armed forces launched the biggest wave of missile attacks on Zaporizhzhia city, shelling it 17 times within an hour.
Trends to watch
Russia may increasingly experiment with strategies to circumvent Ukrainian air defense from missile attacks, for instance by using ‘balloon-shaped objects’ as a distraction.
A number of incidents in Russian or Russian-controlled territories, such as a series of explosions in Russian-held Mariupol several days in a row since 21 February may indicate a new tactic of the Ukrainian army in preparation for a spring counter-offensive.
Russian forces, particularly from the PMC Wagner are being deployed to the Zaporizhzhia front, where they may expect a Ukrainian offensive to break through to the currently Russian-controlled communities of Tokmak and Melitopol.
More Russian defenses are being established in the neighboring east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast and Crimea.
Political and legal updates
Summary
Ukraine continues receiving Western military assistance, including offensive weapons, and likely prepares another counter-offensive move.
Increasing pressure from Ukrainian society and Western partners likely triggered an anti-corruption campaign.
New officials with security background have been appointed by the central government to lead frontline and border regions and municipalities.
Russian President Putin insists Moscow fights the West in Ukraine, while China proposes its peace plan commentators viewed as lacking an actionable plan for implementation.
Kyiv sanctions Russian NGOs, involved in the operation in occupied Ukraine.
Political developments
Western military assistance
On 8 and 9 February, Volodymyr Zelensky visited London, Paris, and Brussels, likely to solidify support for the EU accession and military assistance. This is the second foreign visit since the start of the Russian full-scale invasion in February last year.
In this diplomatic trip, the Ukrainian president met with the British Prime Minister, King Charles III, French President, German Chancellor, and attended the EU summit. Zelensky focused on the need to supply offensive weapons, especially tanks and fighter jets, likely in anticipation of Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in the coming months.
A number of countries have committed to supply tanks and combat vehicles (including US, UK, Germany, Poland). The EU for the first time stressed the right of Ukraine to return Crimea by military means in the joint final document of the EU–Ukraine summit, held in Kyiv on 3 February. However, Western partners are still reluctant to provide jets. Ramstein-9 (14 February) and Munich Security Conferences (18–20 February) focused on air defence systems.
US President Joe Biden during his unannounced visit to Kyiv on 20 February said that Washington will support Ukraine for ‘as long as it takes’.
Combating corruption
The problem of corruption, especially in reconstruction, aid delivery and military assistance, has been one of the key topics in the last two months in Ukraine. Ukrainian society and journalists, who were criticizing the government’s corruption practices more privately following the invasion, have recently become much more outspoken. Western partners’ pressure to address the issue is reportedly growing as well.
At the EU-Ukraine summit in Kyiv on 3 February, Brussels confirmed that Kyiv has to meet the main requirements to join the EU. Three of the seven main reforms are expected to be linked to addressing corruption: 1) anti-corruption reform, 2) anti-money laundering reform; 3) implementation of the anti-oligarchic law. In late January, Defense, State, and USAID Inspectors General visited Kyiv to conduct an audit of the aid delivery.
Several prominent cases are being investigated and a number of high-level officials removed. Yet some observers believe that an anticorruption campaign is likely used for political purposes, as many resignations seem random and several prominent figures widely believed to be engaged in corruption practices remain in place.
In late January 2023, Ukrainian media published an investigation according to which the Ministry of Defense procured food for the Armed Forces rations at prices 2-3 times higher than market. While initially, the ministry deflected these allegations, the Deputy Minister of Defence, Viacheslav Shapovalov, that was responsible for the provision of the army, resigned within the week after the publication.
On 2 February, the SBU detained the former director of the procurement department of the Ministry and the ex-deputy minister. The ex-deputy minister is suspected of lobbying for inflated price contracts and the purchase of low-quality military equipment for a total amount of over ₴1 billion ($27 million). The Parliament (Rada) adopted a draft law stipulating to use public procurement system Prozorro for military purchases.
On 1 February, SBU and the State Investigative Bureau searched the house of former Minister of Interior Arsen Avakov and, reportedly, his former deputies, as part of the investigation into potential corruption in the procurement of French helicopters several years ago. The investigation was triggered by the helicopter crash near Kyiv on 18 January, which killed Ukraine’s Minister of Interior, two of his deputies and 11 more people, including civilians. Avakov, who was occupying the ministerial position in 2014-2021, was considered one of the most influential men in the country and a potential successor to the previous president Poroshenko, with reported links to organised crime and several former volunteer battalions, including Azov regiment.
On 1 February, SBU and the Economic Security Bureau searched the house of Ukrainian oligarch Ihor Kolomoisky in Dnipro. The investigation is reportedly linked to tax evasion. Kolomoisky, who recently was stripped of his Ukrainian passport because of his second citizenship, was widely believed to be a supporter of Zelensky during his unexpected run for the presidency in 2019.
Changes in the regional and municipal authorities
The reshuffle of the cabinet, presidential office, and some regional administrations, which started in January and followed several major corruption scandals, continues. On 6 February, Zelensky announced that heads of civil-military administrations in the frontline and border regions are supposed to have military backgrounds: ‘Those who can prove themselves most effectively in protecting against existing threats’. Some believe the move will help strengthen the central government’s control over the regions. The following day, new heads of Dnipropetrovsk (Serhii Lysak), Zaporizhzhia (Yurii Malashka) and Kherson (Oleksandr Prokudin) oblasts administrations were announced. All three come from the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) and the Ministry of Interior. The previous administration heads were removed in January, along with the leaders of Sumy and Kyiv oblasts. The latter two oblasts are yet to see new appointments.
Chernihiv city has become the first big city, where the elected mayor is replaced by a centrally appointed person with a military background. Chernihiv city administration was transformed into military administration by Zelensky’s decree on 7 February. On 17 February military colonel Dmytro Bryzhynskyi was appointed as its head. In December 2022, the elected mayor Vladyslav Atroshenko was removed from the position for a year by a court decision due to his misuse of public property.
Chernihiv oblast is an example of conflict between the elected mayor of the largest city and the appointed Head of the civil-military administration, reportedly over a disagreement on allocation of funds for reconstruction projects. Atroshenko enjoyed considerable local influence and was among the most active officials organising the city defence against Russian troops in February-April 2022. He founded his political party Native Home in 2020, with its members elected as hromada heads in several locations across the oblast. Strengthening his position, Atroshenko has reportedly built coalitions between different municipalities across the country, including Kyiv city’s municipality.
International context
War is a ‘new normal’ in Russia
On 21 February, President Putin addressed the Russian Parliament reiterating his commitment to continue fighting in Ukraine making clear that the war is a ‘new normal’. He emphasised once again, that the war in Ukraine is only an episode of Russia-West confrontation, as the West intends to destroy and disintegrate Russia. Putin declared that Russia will suspend its participation in the last remaining nuclear arms control pact (START) with the US, which limits the number of deployed intercontinental-range nuclear weapons that both the US and Russia can have. The US announced that Russia likely unsuccessfully tested an intercontinental ballistic missile the same day.
Chinese peace plan
On 24 February, China released a 12-points peace plan for Ukraine. It reflects Beijing’s previous position, calling for the respect of Ukrainian territorial integrity and criticising NATO’s expansion at the same time, but not proposing any roadmap for implementation.
Many experts believe Beijing made this statement to position itself as an independent third party in the international arena, not expecting the plan to be implemented. However, Zelensky said he is ready to meet his Chinese counterpart. The statement came after the Chinese Foreign Minister visited Moscow on 22 February to meet Putin and pledged to strengthen ties.
Legal updates
Seizing Russian oligarchs assets
On 3 February 2023, the US Attorney General authorised the first-ever transfer of Russian assets to Ukraine. $5.4 million seized from an American bank account of sanctioned Russian businessman Konstantin Malofeyev will be transferred to the State Department and then potentially handed over to Ukraine. In early February the European Commission announced it wants to ‘step up its work towards the use of Russia’s frozen assets to support Ukraine’s reconstruction’. In December 2022, Canada initiated the process of seizing $26 million belonging to Russian oligarch Boris Abramovich to transfer them to Ukraine. Many legal experts are skeptical that seizing private Russian funds will go smoothly, as it challenges fundamental rights to property and protection from arbitrary punishment.
Martial law extended
On 7 February, Ukrainian Parliament extended martial law and mobilisation until 20 May. Observers note that the mobilisation efforts have recently become more systemic and active.
Ukraine sanctions Russian NGOs
On 28 February Ukraine introduced a new set of sanctions targeting Russian legal entities and individuals, including those ‘involved in the abduction and illegal trafficking of Ukrainian children to Russia’ (see the Social and Environmental Trends section of this report) and listing the Russian Red Cross among others.
Debates on the legal definition of collaboration
The Ukrainian parliament considered amendments to the Criminal Code article on collaboration, introduced in March last year. The new amendments propose to introduce even stricter punishment and clarify some legal definitions. Ukrainian human rights activists believe the new Law on collaboration is needed, which would distinguish between public officials and regular citizens, often forced to cooperate with occupation authorities to survive. That is essential for the future reintegration of occupied territories. Thousands of collaboration cases have been opened, with Kharkiv, Luhansk and Kherson oblasts leading the list.
Number of criminal proceedings for collaboration per oblast January–October 2022. Source: Liga.net/Prosecutor’s Office
Trends to watch
The increased flow of offensive weapons to Ukraine may indicate a new major military operation.
Corruption and anticorruption measures in aid delivery and reconstruction. • Changes in the balance of power at the regional level.
New peace initiatives.
New legal initiatives on occupied territories in Ukraine.
Legislation on confiscation of Russian assets.
Economic and development updates
Summary
The inflation peak might be over, the forecast for 2023 improved from 21% to 18.7%.
One in three previously employed Ukrainian has lost their job due to the invasion, whilst 26% unemployment is predicted for 2023.
A third of 67 Ukrainian banks ending the year with a loss, and eight banks ceased to exist.
The grain deal expires on 18 March and prospects for extension are unclear.
The grain harvest decreased from 86 million tons in 2021 to 54 million tonnes in 2022. About 30 million tonnes of grain is still awaiting export.
Main indicators
Inflation peak might be over
The National Bank of Ukraine announced it had no plans to change the official exchange rate of $1 = ₴36.6. It has updated its 2023 inflation forecast from 21% to 18.7%, citing weaker consumer demand, lower global inflation, and recently confirmed incoming international aid.
From December to January, monthly inflation increased by 0.8%, while annual inflation slowed from 26.6% to 26%.
Food and soft beverages have become on average 34.4% more expensive over the last year. The largest increase was in the price of eggs, which was influenced by the damage and destruction of major poultry and egg farms.
Increased prices of fruit and vegetables were influenced by a combination of factors, such as the occupation of fertile Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts.
Power outages led to decreased production and the assortment of Ukrainian greenhouse vegetables and greens and increased import. The use of generators additionally increased the price.
Labour market
The National Bank of Ukraine predicts 26% unemployment in 2023. One in three previously employed Ukrainian has lost their job due to the invasion. Most Ukrainians report a partial loss of income, while 10% say they have lost almost all.
The Ministry of Economy is working on the project ‘Work without barriers’ to make access to work as easy as possible for the most vulnerable Ukrainians, in particular people with disabilities, veterans, youth without work experience, and internally displaced people. Currently, 40% of all unemployed people fall into this category.
The project envisions easy and fast registry at the State Employment Service through Diia e-governance app, professional guidance, job search services, and access to multiple vocational education programmes.
Housing markets
As of January, the average rent for a one-room flat in the Zakarpattia Oblast has increased by 203% since the start of the invasion and amounted to ₴17,577 ($480) — the highest in the country, followed by the Lviv Oblast with a 75% increase to ₴17,065 ($466). The third place goes to Kyiv with an average rent of ₴15,576 ($425) which dropped by almost 11% since January 2022.
The overall demand for residential real estate fell by 85% last year, with a significant decline registered in October-December, coinciding with Russian attacks on energy infrastructure.
Key sectors
Agriculture: Grain Deal
Throughout February, marine traffic at Ukrainian ports remained at the lowest level since the start of the grain corridor initiative with an average of two–three ships per day. Mercy Corps sources and media report that Russian sabotage leads to long queues with an average waiting time from two to five weeks, as only five–seven inspections are carried out per day instead of the minimum 16–18 required. This leads to millions of losses for cargo owners. In the last three months alone, the world has not received 10 million tonnes of Ukrainian food. Russia denies the allegations.
The grain agreement, signed in July 2022 and extended in November, will expire on 18 March. 23 million tons of agriculture products have been exported over the last seven months. The Ministry of Agriculture of Ukraine reported, despite the decrease in the grain harvest in 2022 (from 86 million tonnes in 2021 to 54 million tonnes), that about 30 million tonnes of stored grain are ready to be exported.
Ukraine wants to prolong the agreement for at least one year, include not only Odesa ports, but Mykolaiv, which would allow exporting up to 8 million tonnes per month, instead of 3 million as currently.
The government allocated ₴20 billion ($0.54 billion) to ensure the vessels coming to Ukrainian ports. Kyiv also wants to extend the nomenclature of goods for export, such as steel. Due to the blockade of seaports, Ukraine's metal exports have decreased by 62.6% in 2022.
Russia is reluctant to renew the agreement unless it benefits from the deal. Russian Foreign Ministry said although Western sanctions have not directly affected the Russian agricultural sector, they affect payments, shipping and insurance and therefore create a ‘barrier’ to grain and fertilizer exports. Moscow would also like its ammonia fertilizers to be exported from Odesa port, connected to Russia by an ammonia pipeline.
Financial sector
Due to the full-scale war, the profitability of Ukrainian banks has decreased by more than five times, with almost a third of 67 Ukrainian banks ending the year with a loss. The share of non-performing loans (NPL) in the banking sector increased to 38% as of 1 January 2023, compared to 30% on 1 January 2022.
In 2022 four banks were liquated, Megabank and Bank Sich went bankrupt, and two banks with Russian ties, Prominvestbank and the renamed Sberbank, were closed. Currently, there are 67 banks operating in the country, while discussions are still ongoing about the future of the Russian-owned Alfa Bank (recently changed its name to Sense Bank).
Trends to watch
Developments surrounding the Grain Deal.
Stability of financial institutions.
Unemployment and changes in the labour market.
Inflation and prices of basic goods.
Social and environmental trends
Summary
One year on, UN reports over 8,000 Ukrainian civilians killed in the Russian invasion.
5.4 million people are internally displaced across Ukraine, and most are not planning to return to their homes in the next few months.
New Russian youth subculture spreads across Ukraine, hundreds of teenagers take parts in mass fights.
Environmental damage caused by war estimated to about $51 billion. War-caused pollution affects water sources, air quality, and agricultural land.
Kakhovka Reservoir has dropped to its lowest level in 30 years, threatening to leave hundreds of thousands without water and affect the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant security.
Social trends
Civilian casualties
The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) verified a total of 8,006 civilian deaths during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as of 26 February 2023. Of them, 488 were children. Furthermore, 13,479 people were reported to have been injured. However, OHCHR specified that actual figures could be higher. OHCHR data shows slow but steady decline in the monthly number of victims since March last year.
Displaced people unlikely to return home soon
As of 23 January 2023, IOM estimates 5.4 million IDPs are displaced across Ukraine, additional 5.56 million are people who returned after initial displacement. Frontline oblasts of Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk and Kyiv became hotspots for IDPs from other communities of either the same region or from neighbouring Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.
IOM, January 2023
Recent data shows internally displaced people are not planning to return to their homes soon, with only 5% planning to do so in the next two weeks, and 12% in the next three months. A quarter of those considering relocation want to move abroad (preferably to Germany or Poland). The attitude towards refugees is ambiguous: women with children are tolerated the most, the attitude towards men of military age is the most negative. Integration and long-term solutions are a priority for most of the displaced inside and outside Ukraine.
Almost half of Ukraine’s residents (45%) don’t plan their life at all, only 19% have plans for several years ahead. A similar trend is observed in the business community. Due to the war, most Ukrainian companies build strategies only for the short period of time, typically from one to three months.
Increasing protection challenges
Since the war started, over 15 million Ukrainians report a deterioration of their mental health. Children are at particular risk: 1.5 million children are predicted to require mental health and psychosocial support; calls to domestic violence hotlines grew by 50% in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, and by 35% in other regions. At least 6,000 Ukrainian children are reportedly being held in education facilities in Russia, which may constitute a war crime.
New Russian youth subculture spreads across Ukraine
On 27 February, hundreds of teenagers who belong to the Russian youth subculture inspired by the Japanese anime, Redan Private Military Company, gathered for mass fights in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Lviv, Zhytomyr, and Ivano-Frankivsk. On 28 February, the police blocked 18 Redan channels and group chats and detained several 13-16-years old leaders. Over 500 teenagers were detained across Russia and Belarus in the last days after participating in Redan mass fights, mostly in shopping malls.
Environmental trends
Ukrainian authorities estimate that environmental damage caused by 12 months of hostilities amounts to around ₴1.9 trillion ($51 billion). This includes more than 280,000 m2 of contaminated soil, and 14 million m2 of land littered with remains of destroyed objects and ammunition. Further, 687,000 tonnes of petroleum products were burned during shelling, polluting the air with dangerous substances, and 1,597 tonnes of metal and chemical have polluted water, including groundwater sources. In Kharkiv Oblast, water in households and the lake in the villages of Verkhnia and Nizhnia Ozeriana showed an excess of oil products by 11.8 times and iron by 37.7 times. In Kryvyi Rih, ecoactivists discovered that only 25% of inspected alternative sources of water were suitable for sanitary and domestic needs.
At the same time, some enterprises that were previously major polluters were destroyed due to the war or stopped operating fully or partially. After the destruction of Donetsk region's industry, the city of Kryvyi Rih remains the largest centre of industrial pollution in Ukraine.
Critical threats to water supply in the south
Water supply in the south of Ukraine is a critical problem. Since early November 2022, when Russian troops left the right bank of River Dnipro in Kherson oblast, spillways at the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (remaining under Russian control) have been opened. The Kakhovka reservoir has dropped to its lowest level in 3 decades, putting irrigation and drinking water resources at risk, as well as jeopardising the coolant systems for the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant.
On 16 February, Prime Minister called on international partners to pressure Russia to close the spillways, warning that otherwise 70% of settlements receiving water from River Dnipro may lose access to drinking water. According to some experts, dynamics of the water level decrease indicate that the reservoir will reach the critical water supply mark in three months.
Trends to watch
Attitude toward returnees
Social cohesion in communities hosting displaced people
Main causes of civilian death and injuries
Emergence of violent and vigilante groups
Situation with Kakhovka water reservoir and water sources pollution
Neighbouring countries
Summary
Poland commits to significantly increase its army and military spending while deepening cooperation with the US and NATO. Relations with the EU remain controversial, although steps have been taken to unfreeze financial assistance.
Political conflict between Warsaw and Minsk deepened, affecting cross-border movement.
Moldova goes through political turmoil as government resigns and allegedly Kremlin-linked opposition forces take people to the streets to protest high energy tariffs, stricter security measures, and the government’s support of Ukraine.
The new Moldovan government takes steps to distance itself from Russia, including passing a law outlawing separatism and withdrawing from dozens of treaties under the Russia-led Commonwealth of Independent States.
Poland
Joe Biden’s visit
Ahead of the anniversary of the invasion, US President Joe Biden paid an unannounced visit to Ukraine, followed by a two-day visit in Poland, where he reiterated his commitment to Ukraine and NATO.
Biden discussed strengthening NATO’s eastern flank with Polish President Andrzej Duda. On the anniversary of the invasion, Poland announced sending its Leopard tanks to Ukraine. Earlier in the month, the US approved a $10 billion arms sale to Poland comprising mid-range, mobile HIMARS artillery rocket systems, associated ammunition, and related equipment. Poland, benefitting from the US and other countries’ military assistance, has pledged to double its armed forces in the next few years and spend 4% of its GDP on military in 2023, a sharp increase from 2.5% in 2022.
Biden’s second visit to Warsaw in a year demonstrates not only the strategic importance of Poland for NATO, but a shift in the attitudes of the current Poland political leadership. The ruling Law and Justice was a vocal Donald Trump supporter during the 2022 US elections, and President Duda didn’t initially congratulate Biden on his election alongside only Putin, Orbán, and Bolsonaro. Observers note Duda’s increasing independence from Law and Justice and possible aspirations for career in international structures after his second term is over in 2025.
With growing US military support, relations with the EU remain controversial. The Sejm, a lower house of Polish parliament, adopted a new law on judicial accountability in an attempt to unfreeze over €35 billion in EU pandemic recovery funds. The EU earlier suspended the package over the government’s policies allowing it to control the judiciary.
Poland and Hungary were flagged as the ‘worst offenders’ in terms of rule of law violations in an annual report by EU human rights watchdog Liberties. According to the report, these governments ‘continue to implement a series of measures designed to centralise power, silence their opponents, control public opinion, and make it very difficult to lose future elections’.
Belarus border tensions intensify
On 21 February, Poland ordered the closure of all roads to Belarus for trucks registered outside the EU and EFTA, following reports that Polish border guards and two members of the Polish consulate in the border city of Hrodna had been expelled. The move continues the trend of border fortification, started with Poland building a 186-kilmetre fence in 2022 in response to tens of thousands of migrants from the Middle East and Africa crossing from Belarus.
Earlier in February, Belarus jailed ethnic Polish Belarusian journalist and government critic advocating the rights of Polish minority Andrzej Poczobut for eight years, which prompted Poland to retaliate by closing one of the two car traffic crossings between the countries. In turn, Belarus banned Polish trucks from entering the country via Lithuania or Latvia.
The new regulations would even further restrict trade and complicate logistics in Belarus, as the sky over the country has been closed since February 2022. It will also affect trucks from Russia and other countries transiting through Belarus.
Demographic crisis
New research revealed that the birth rate in Poland has decreased by 40% over the last 30 years. The statistic is a major blow to Law and Justice’s government which has implemented a number of pro-natalist policies, such as 500 złoty ($110) monthly allowance for every child in the family, as well as a near-total abortion ban.
While the government and local Catholic Church hierarchs blame the media for the crisis, others link it with economic uncertainty, a lack of job security, and strict abortion laws.
Trends to watch
Political tensions and reshuffles ahead of the autumn parliamentary elections
The rule of law crisis and the conflict with the EU
Societal attitudes towards refugees from Ukraine
Abortion and LGBT laws
Security situation at the Belarusian border
Moldova
Prime Minister resigns
Moldova’s prime minister Natalia Gavrilița stepped down and her government resigned after 18 months of political and economic turmoil in the country, mostly connected to difficulties in relation to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. She has been succeeded by former interior minister and President Sandu’s defence adviser, Dorin Recean.
The collapse of Gavrilița’s government comes amid speculations of a sustained destabilisation campaign by Russia and pro-Russian forces inside the country, which has likely fuelled frequent protests between August and February 2022.
A recent statement by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov that NATO and the West would be interested in repeating a ‘Ukraine scenario’ in Moldova, further fuelled speculation of possible Russian aggression. On 9 February Ukrainian President Zelensky announced in Brussels that he and his secret services have shared with his Moldovan counterpart intercepted Russian plans to destabilize Moldova. Ukraine deployed additional armed forces at the border with a Moldovan breakaway region of Transnistria.
The reshuffle of the government was announced just hours after Russian missiles flew over Moldovan airspace and is believed to be motivated by the desire to focus more on security measures in relation to the war in Ukraine. On 10 February, during Russia’s most recent large-scale cruise missile attack against Ukraine, two Kalibr rockets crossed into Moldova violating Moldovan airspace — not for the first time. Since the beginning of this invasion in February 2022, debris of Russian missiles landed several times in Moldova, such as in mid-January 2023, in December and in October 2022.
Already following Gavrilița’s resignation, Foreign Minister Nicu Popescu announced Moldova’s withdrawal from ‘dozens’ of some 330 treaties that make up for Moldova’s membership in the Russialed organisation bringing together post-Soviet states, Commonwealth of Independent States. It’s an indication that the new government is going to maintain its strongly pro-Western course.
Political tensions grow
On 13 February, President Sandu announced new laws equipping intelligence services ‘with the necessary tools to more effectively combat risks to the country’s security’, which prompted angry reactions from the Gagauz minority and influential pro-Russian communist party.
GAGAUZIA
The autonomous region is often considered a gateway for Russian influence over Moldova, as the minority there is mostly Russian speaking and their leaders showed pro-Russian affiliations in the past. In 1990, during the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Gagauzia declared independence, but was peacefully integrated into Moldova in 1994.
Deputy chair of the oligarch-linked Șor Party, Marina Tauber called the opposition to jointly protest against the government. The party’s founder Ilan Șor was convicted of fraud in 2017 over the theft of about $1 billion from three Moldovan banks in 2014 and is known for his ties with the Kremlin. According to information by the US Treasury, Șor is involved in coordinating with other Moldovan oligarchs in destabilising actions against the government, fuelling political unrest in Moldova.
Mass protests organised by Șor party on 28 February resulted in clashes with police. Protesters were demanding the government to fully subsidise citizens’ winter energy bills and to ‘not involve the country in war’. Prior to Russia’s invasion, Moldova relied 100% on Russia for gas. Russia’s reduction of gas supplies to Moldova sparked an energy crisis and increased tariffs. Moreover, as Moldova’s Soviet-era energy systems remains interconnected with Ukraine’s, power outages in Ukraine’s south leave numerous households in Moldova in the dark as well.
Law on separatism
Heated political and societal discussion emerged from the Moldovan parliament adoption of a law outlawing separatism on 2 February. The law was supported by around 60% of the parliament.
The current version of the law proposes imprisonment and huge fines for creating illegal information structures, calls for separatism, establishment of a foreign state, and espionage for a foreign state.
The debate around the law poses also a challenge to the fragile ceasefire between Moldova and the internationally unrecognised breakaway region of Transnistria.
The unrecognised parliament of Transnistria protested against the law, and declared Chișinău’s actions ‘an act of aggression aimed at undermining the negotiation process’, and a ‘pretext for human rights violations.
Moldovan authorities, try to alleviate the tension by emphasising that the law will not affect the majority of Transnistria’s residents, public administration, NGOs, and companies.
TRANSNISTRIA
Transnistria declared independence following a 1990–1992 war, and currently stations about 1,500 Russian soldiers as well as 15,000 local military personnel. Roughly 220,000 of Transnistria’s 300,000 inhabitants hold Russian passports.
Trends to watch
New political announcements.
Anti-government demonstrations.
Security incidents in relation to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Role of oligarchs in Moldova.
Debate on legislation on separatism.
Relations and peace process with Transnistria.