Scenario Report: Influential factors affecting the security and humanitarian situation - February 2024
7 Feb 2024
Photo by Valentyn Chernetskyi on Unsplash
Introduction
Ongoing hostilities continue to define the humanitarian landscape in Ukraine. Nevertheless, nearly two years into the full-scale war, political and economic developments within and beyond Ukraine’s borders are increasingly influencing the conflict and subsequent humanitarian issues. In this scenario report, UACAT analyzes the main factors affecting the potential outcomes for Ukraine over the next six months and suggests four possible scenarios.
With limited resources on both sides of the conflict, it is unlikely that we will witness territorial gains or population movements on the same scale as in 2022. Ukraine’s successful defense of its territory partly depends on its ability to mobilize financial resources, ammunition, and manpower. However, the public’s diminishing trust in the government may make mobilization more difficult. Meanwhile in Russia, if Putin is elected president for the fifth time in this spring’s elections – which is all but guaranteed – it may give him an even greater feeling of impunity.
In complex humanitarian contexts – by delving deeper into the conditions that underpin a given crisis – scenarios can help aid actors to anticipate how a situation may unfold. Robust scenarios can inform the design and implementation of aid at strategic, operational, and programmatic levels. UACAT has identified four possible security scenarios and their humanitarian implications, together with the likelihood of each, based on our analysts’ expert opinions.
Methodology
The scenarios and analyses of influential factors presented in this report were developed through research and a series of analytical workshops that provided an informed, structured method for analyzing likely events, as well as those more difficult to foresee.
UACAT Scenario-building process
Preliminary workshop and analytical framework
UACAT met to discuss key research questions and to establish the parameters for scenario-building. As a prerequisite, the team identified the analytical framework for this report.
Geographical Scope
UACAT delineated the geographical scope for this analysis. This encompasses the macro-level implications of the war as well as national, regional, and international variables that would impact the security situation in Ukraine.
Timeframe
To answer these questions, we considered contextual events of particular importance to Ukraine, and as a result set our scenario-building parameter at six months.
Purpose of analysis
To pilot the process and determine the scope required for scenario-building, UACAT established that the aim of this report is to guide strategic discussions with operational partners and donors concerning positioning for future interventions and how to become more effective in delivering aid.
Data gathering
UACAT collected data from a variety of primary and secondary sources in order to clarify the current situation and to identify variables about which we have less information but want to monitor. Close examination of the data enabled our analysts to map variables that will most likely influence the context over the next six months.
Hypothesis validation workshop
Based on the information gathered, UACAT held a second workshop to prioritize an analysis of those political, economic and geographic factors that could impact the security situation in Ukraine and subsequently have a positive or negative impact on humanitarian needs.
Scenario-building
A short narrative describing each scenario was drafted, along with an analysis of the primary factors guiding these hypothetical outcomes.
Contributing Factors
Political and Legal
Continued centralization of authority
With martial law still in place, Ukraine cannot hold parliamentary or presidential elections, which were originally scheduled for October 2023 and March 2024, respectively. Zelensky remains the country's most trusted public figure, with a confidence rating of 70.7% as of December 2023. He and his office continue to concentrate power in the executive branch, increasing control over political, military, economic and humanitarian affairs.
While this may preserve stability at home and foster dialogue with foreign partners, greater political influence over military operations will likely complicate relations between the president and his commander-in-chief. This can affect morale in the army and in the wider society, which in turn could make mobilization more problematic.
Local authorities at district and city levels who – thanks to pre-2022 decentralization reforms – now enjoy expanded powers, will become increasingly dependent on central authorities. This may erode accountability vis-à-vis the local population.
The government will enforce the new, stricter regulations governing the import of humanitarian assistance, which hampers the ability of small and medium-sized organizations to operate effectively. This will have a negative impact on localization efforts by international actors and likely delay humanitarian aid reaching frontline regions. A decreased amount of humanitarian and other assistance can result in the authorities more closely monitoring and controlling the remaining aid.
Government approval ratings and reshuffles
Public support for the current government fell in 2023. At year’s end, despite the government’s near-complete control of the media and an absence of any meaningful opposition, 30% of the population said they do not trust President Zelensky – a 10% increase over the beginning of the year. Distrust in the government stood at 63% in December 2023. Andrii Yermak, Zelensky’s head of office, and Davyd Arakhamia, the head of the ruling party faction in the Verkhovna Rada, are among the country’s least trusted politicians, with disapproval ratings of 54% and 57%, respectively. Independent media investigations have revealed several major corruption scandals, particularly in the Ministry of Defense. In addition, ongoing protests are demanding increased military spending. Stricter mobilization and tighter rules for Ukrainian men travelling abroad have negatively affected social cohesion and further eroded trust in the government.
In a bid to bolster public support for the government, Zelensky may decide to change officials in his cabinet. Dismissing Valery Zaluzhny, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, may have the opposite effect, however, as Zaluzhny is widely perceived as a talented general and the architect of the resistance against Russia at the start of the invasion. At the end of 2023, 72% of the public were not in favor of his dismissal. Oleksandr Syrskyi, the army general who was appointed Commander-in-Chief on February 8, 2024, is less known to and trusted by the public. In December 2023, 48% of the public said they did not know who he was. Syrskyi is well known to the army, however, after serving as ground forces commander between 2019 and 2024 and leading major counteroffensive operations in the last two years.
The government may focus on mobilizing domestic resources and imposing greater control over public resources. It may place the country even more on a war footing, boost mobilization, fight corruption and nationalize strategically important companies.
Elections
If Ukraine were to suspend martial law or amend the constitution to enable elections to be held this year, Zelensky would stand a good chance of being re-elected. The ruling party, Servant of the People, is less likely to obtain broad popular support, since 66% of Ukrainians do not trust the parliament and 76% do not trust any political party.
Holding elections would pose multiple challenges, first among them the safety of voters and international observers. Kyiv does not have control over a sizable portion of its territory, and several million Ukrainians currently live under Russian occupation. Over a quarter of the population remains displaced internally or abroad and would face difficulties voting, as would the one million individuals currently under arms. All these factors could result in the legitimacy of any election results being called into question. Finally, members of the Ukrainian military are restricted in their right to run for office, a significant challenge in a country in which the army has the highest trust rating (94%).
Ceasefire
Potential Russian advances in spring/summer 2024 and decreased Western assistance may force Kyiv to begin unfavorable negotiations with Moscow. A comprehensive peace deal is unlikely to be achieved soon, and a ceasefire may freeze the front lines. As the history of the war in Ukraine shows, ceasefires are unlikely to last, but they give both sides a chance to rest, rearm, and collect their dead. It may enable assistance to be delivered to frontline communities.
Although public support for territorial concessions to Russia nearly doubled during the last year, it still only stands at 19%. A ceasefire – or any other political agreement with Russia – is likely to result in mass protests and a dramatic decline in the public’s trust in the government, with civil society and the media largely opposing negotiations. In January 2024, Nobel Peace Prize laureate and human rights activist Oleksandra Matviychuk said that it is not a time to seek peace and that making a deal with Russia would mean surrender.
Economic
Budget deficit
The 2024 budget that was adopted in November is based on estimated revenues of $43.7 billion, or about half of the country’s anticipated expenditures of $82.3 billion. For the third year in a row, Ukraine remains dependent on international loans and grants, especially to cover social and development needs. In 2024, Ukraine's public debt will likely reach nearly 100% of GDP with debt servicing (interest) accounting for 5.5% of GDP, whereas in 2021 it came to 48.9%.
Military spending accounts for 22% of GDP – a sharp decline from 39% in 2023. This is likely linked to a decline in direct military assistance from the West. Although Ukraine earmarks nearly all its domestic revenues to cover military needs, this still represents only a third of Russia’s military budget of $110-120 billion, and the government is facing domestic protests demanding that money be spent on the war rather than on development. Nevertheless, redistributing local taxes to the military may make the situation on the ground even more dire and increase local authorities’ dependence on the central government.
Pensions and social benefits make up the bulk of the budget and account for 14.5% of GDP, a 1.5% increase over 2022. Ten million pensioners – nearly a quarter of the pre-invasion population – are among the most vulnerable individuals, as they rely on government assistance. They often form much of the population in areas hardest hit by the war, since they are less likely to evacuate. With unemployment reaching 20% in November 2023, pensions are often the main source of income for the neediest families (the unemployed and those with multiple children), including IDPs. Pensions and social benefits paid to those in frontline communities help to maintain the government’s legitimacy. The payment of pensions in the occupied territories was often one of Russia’s first gestures, likely in an effort to win hearts and minds.
Foreign funding
Kyiv expects that money received from the US and the EU will cover its nearly $40 billion budget deficit. The US will have to overcome significant political challenges to approve the funding. A $60 billion aid request by President Biden remains stalled in Congress. On February 1, the EU managed to overcome Hungary’s veto and approve a four-year €50 billion support package. This should prevent Ukraine from issuing money and thus avoid potentially spiraling inflation. A $5 billion loan from the IMF will supposedly come with a 7% interest rate, high enough to significantly increase the government’s debt.
Domestic resource mobilization
If foreign funding is delayed, the government may be forced to cut all non-critical expenses, including development and reconstruction projects, and may find itself unable to pay pensions to 10 million people and salaries to nearly two million public employees.
A tax increase is another unpopular option. In 2023, tax rates were returned to their pre-invasion level and tax inspections were reintroduced. In November, the Verkhovna Rada approved an increase in the corporate tax rate for banks from 18% to 25% and retroactively increased the 2023 tax rate for banks to 50%. In the coming years, taxes are expected to rise to 6–7% of GDP.
Issuing currency and using the liquidity reserves of the national banking system are last resorts. In 2022, the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) printed UAH 400 billion. The budgeted devaluation of the hryvna is 13%. These factors could trigger a government default in coming years.
Regional Development
Export routes and EU quotas
Blockades along Ukraine’s western borders – including those with Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Moldova – continued in the early months of 2024. Compromise measures have not yet been agreed on, and it is likely that these will be less favorable for Ukraine than they were in 2022. If the Moldovan blockades expand, the Moldovan government may – in light of upcoming elections – take a harder stance as regards the transit of Ukrainian goods, which may negatively affect Ukrainian farmers. Moldova plays a critical role in Ukrainian grain reaching ports on the Danube.
The Autostrada Moldovei, a new high-speed motorway, will soon link Ukraine’s Bukovina region (Chernivtsi Oblast) with Danube ports in Romania and Moldova. Additionally, the EU has allocated over 40 million euros to enhance railway infrastructure in Moldova. These projects also pave the way for Ukrainian goods to reach Greek, Romanian and Bulgarian seaports.
The blockade has already created additional challenges for agricultural production and has negatively affected farmers’ livelihoods and ability to plan, since many growers have shifted to selling their produce on European markets following the full-scale invasion and the Black Sea blockade.
The EU must take a leading role in solving Ukraine’s agri-food export problems, especially considering the need for negotiations regarding Ukrainian production quotas as part of the country’s EU integration process. Farmers protesting Brussels policy across Western Europe will further complicate free access for Ukrainian agricultural products to the European market in the short term, and accession negotiations in the long term.
The Black Sea corridor – established by Ukraine after Russia withdrew from the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI) in July 2023 – saw 4.8 million metric tons of food shipped in December of 2023, surpassing the highest total exported under the BSGI. Nevertheless, Russian air attacks and naval mines continue to pose a threat. Moreover, the current crisis in the Red Sea could affect Ukrainian exports, as almost a third of its Black Sea exports travel to China via the Red Sea. A senior Ukrainian government official told Reuters that, due to the Red Sea crisis, January 2024 exports are expected to fall by 20% compared to the previous month.
Russian elections
When Putin is reelected on March 15, he may be able to overcome existing cracks in the war support and enjoy even greater elite support to continue the war, mobilize internal resources and potentially launch a new offensive campaign. Russia may enjoy greater political support from countries that have heretofore been sympathetic, potentially due to a shared stance over the war in Gaza. In the runup to the American presidential elections, the Kremlin may attempt to make American aid for Ukraine a divisive topic. Greater polarization around US support for Ukraine would likely contribute to a net decrease in the public’s support for Ukraine, as Republicans lawmakers and voters coalesce around a more anti-Ukrainian stance.
Security Scenarios and Humanitarian Implications
SCENARIO ONE
Ukraine withstands Russia’s stepped-up offensive and regains some occupied territory
After withstanding Russia’s offensive in the first months of 2024, Ukrainian forces inflict large losses on Russia’s military personnel and materiel. If Kyiv receives sufficient military and financial assistance from the West, and successfully mobilizes more military personnel, Ukrainian forces may push Russia eastward, away from its current position along the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast. This is facilitated by the fact that Russia is slow at stockpiling weapons and resupplying its forces. This creates a situation in which Kherson city and other communities along the right bank of the Dnipro are no longer within range of Russian artillery. Though these communities would still be the focus of frequent drone and missile strikes – especially those targeting Ukrainian forces’ cross-river supply lines – the added distance from the front line would significantly relieve pressure on them. Ukraine might be able to target Russian positions and supply lines closer to the Isthmus of Perekop.
Elsewhere, Ukraine makes modest advances – perhaps a few kilometers – in Zaporizhzhia Oblast towards Tokmak in its effort to cut rail and road links between occupied areas in the southeast and Crimea, and occupied areas in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. The position of the front lines in Donetsk, Luhansk, and Kharkiv oblasts remain largely unchanged from their locations at the end of 2023.
Countrywide, the number of drone and missile attacks stagnate – and even decrease – compared with levels observed in the fourth quarter of 2023, which witnessed 129 attacks on oblasts far from the front lines and the Russian border. i Assaults on energy and other civilian infrastructures are significantly lower than those seen in the winter of 2022/23. Ukrainian drone attacks on Russia and Russian-held territories increase as the delivery of more long-range weapon systems extends Ukraine’s striking range.
Humanitarian implications
In Kherson Oblast, the evolving military situation, in which Kherson and Beryslav districts are beyond the range of Russian artillery, brings relief and stabilization, and reduces civilian casualties and infrastructure damage. Road networks improve and demining efforts actively clear territory, enabling government authorities, private companies, and organizations to engage in early recovery efforts, and humanitarian groups to operate with fewer safety risks. These efforts improve access to previously dangerous districts along the Dnipro’s right bank and facilitate the distribution of humanitarian aid to communities that had been the target of frequent shelling. Unimpeded access to territories recently returned to Ukrainian control remains restricted for a few months due to security considerations.
Figure 1. Front line in the vicinity of Kherson
However, the barely changing front lines in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts mean these regions will continue to suffer a humanitarian crisis, hindering aid access and contributing to limited civilian displacement from some areas, such as Avdiivka and Chasiv Yar, up to Kostyantynivka. While fewer drone and missile attacks offer temporary respite on Ukrainian-held territory, more frequent strikes on Russia and Russia-controlled territories cause civilian casualties to rise. Cities in Russia within striking distance of Ukraine’s long-range weapons could face increased attacks, and civilian aviation may become disrupted.
SCENARIO TWO
The frontline positions as of late 2023 largely hold
Some frontline pockets of territory under Ukrainian control are taken by Russian forces. Russia focuses on the Kupiansk district in Kharkiv Oblast. Its proximity to the Russian border enables more efficient supply lines, which facilitate advances, although Russia has only minimal success in penetrating deeper into the oblast. Regular attacks on Kharkiv city and its district continue. The front lines in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts remain largely in place, with fierce and ongoing battles, notably in the Pokrovsk district and nearby communities. Avdiivka ultimately falls into Russian hands.
Figure 2. Front line in the vicinity of Zaporizhzhia
In Zaporizhzhia Oblast, Ukrainian forces make minimal headway. They maintain their presence in Robotyne yet struggle to retain control over neighboring small villages. This prevents them from advancing towards Tokmak and beyond, in their bid to sever logistical links between the eastern and western parts of Russian-occupied territory.
The Ukrainian army fails to move deeper into Kherson Oblast, although it maintains a bridgehead in Krynky on the east bank of the Dnipro. Kherson city and other communities along the west bank of the Dnipro remain within artillery range and continue to be shelled by Russian forces.
Although strikes on energy and other civilian infrastructures continue at roughly the same level as the last quarter of 2023, they do not reach the levels seen in the winter of 2022/2023. Sporadic Ukrainian drone attacks inflict damage in Russian-controlled territories of Ukraine and occasionally in Russia itself, particularly areas near the Ukrainian border, leading to power outages and disruptions to the water supply. Ukraine continues to attack Russian naval infrastructure and military supply lines, especially in Crimea.
Humanitarian implications
The humanitarian crisis persists amidst the ongoing war. Relentless shelling of the cities of Kherson and Kharkiv drives up civilian casualties and disrupts essential services. Mandatory evacuations in Zaporizhzhia, Kharkiv, Donetsk, and Kherson oblasts empty much of the frontline areas. Humanitarian access for those who remain is hampered by deteriorating road infrastructure and increased contamination from ERWs, UXOs, and mines.
In Donetsk and Luhansk, the civilian population suffers from the lack of basic services, particularly in Pokrovsk district, Avdiivka and neighboring communities, as some residents, primarily the elderly and disabled, are unable to leave. Large-scale displacements are not observed, since in some communities many local residents have already left. Mandatory evacuations in Donetsk to areas farther from the frontlines are primarily focused on children.
In Kharkiv Oblast, the situation in Kupiansk city and district remains tense. Population movements increase, as anywhere between 2,000 and 5,000 residents flee within Kharkiv Oblast and to destinations across the country. Some limited movement occurs close to the Russian border, as well as in areas within five kilometers of the Russian border in Sumy and Chernihiv oblasts, due to cross-border shelling.
SCENARIO THREE
Ukraine fails to maintain control over many frontline areas and Russian forces make territorial gains
In this scenario, Ukraine fails to produce enough ammunition and drones, and Western arms supplies are insufficient. With the government facing resistance to its mobilization efforts, Kyiv is unable to maintain control over a number of frontline areas. In the south, Ukraine loses its foothold on the west bank of the Dnipro, and Russia increases its troop presence in the area to ensure Ukrainian forces cannot re-cross the river. Russian forces strengthen their defense lines, trenches, and mines along this front, preventing Ukraine from making any territorial gains. Russia makes headway in Kharkiv Oblast, seizing control of much of the Kupiansk district, as Kupiansk city becomes the focus of the most intense fighting of the war. In Donetsk Oblast, Russia gains ground all the way up to Sloviansk, a key city connecting Donetsk and Kharkiv, although it is unable to take it. Russian forces make less significant advances along the southern part of the Donetsk front, but they take Avdiivka and put significant pressure on Kostiantynivka, a key logistical hub. In Zaporizhzhia, Russian forces re-take Robotyne and the surrounding communities and push north from there, making modest gains of a few kilometers.
Civilian infrastructure in frontline areas, including energy facilities, is regularly targeted with Russian drone and missile attacks, leading to large-scale power outages and issues with heating and water supply. Major cities, such as Kharkiv, Kherson, Dnipro, and Zaporizhzhya are under constant air attack, as Ukrainian air defense capacities are depleted. This significantly affects the quality of life in heavily targeted areas and, together with increased Russian territorial gains, heightens pessimism among the population and exacerbates public anxiety, perhaps leading to a government shake-up.
Humanitarian implications
Intensified attacks in Kherson Oblast exacerbate the humanitarian crisis for residents resisting evacuation. While food security and market functionality are stable, Kherson city remains under constant strain, heightening protection-related risks and negatively affecting the mental well-being of the remaining population. Access to the city remains feasible with train and stable road connections, facilitating aid deliveries to nearby communities. However, as areas near the frontline in the oblast become harder to reach, operational risks and access constraints by Ukrainian authorities limit humanitarian aid in these underserved regions, particularly within five kilometers of the Dnipro.
In Ukrainian-controlled Donetsk Oblast, notably the Pokrovsk district, civilians who have resisted evacuation face a grim and worsening situation. Russian control over Avdiivka and parts of the Kramatorsk district, particularly areas near Chasiv Yar and approaching Kostiantynivka, heightens insecurity there, making humanitarian access essentially impossible. Civilians largely refrain from venturing outside, except for necessities like food. Shifting front lines result in limited displacement from cities such as Kostiantynivka, Kramatorsk, Sloviansk, and Pokrovsk, with displaced persons from these areas numbering in the hundreds. IDPs seek refuge primarily in urban areas in Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts, which are relatively close to Donetsk Oblast, where they hope to return. Others relocate to more distant parts of Ukraine. Meanwhile, the number of returnees to areas near the front lines and previously occupied areas drops considerably, as uncertainty grows about possible Russian territorial gains.
Figure 3. Front line in the vicinity of Donetsk
As Russian forces advance within the Kupiansk district and up to Kupiansk city, the situation worsens and displacements increase, with up to 5,000 residents fleeing the conflict. These IDPs primarily relocate to Kharkiv city – despite the increasing number of attacks there – and urban areas within Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. A much smaller number flee to other cities across the country. Ukrainian authorities enforce evacuations, particularly of children, in these and neighboring communities.
Russia’s targeting of critical civilian infrastructure exacerbates disruptions to vital services such as heating and water, amplifying the country’s humanitarian crisis. Quality of life is significantly impacted in locations nationwide, but particularly in areas up to 30 km from the frontline. Anxiety grows due to power outages, damage to civilian infrastructure, and concerns over Russian territorial gains. This takes a toll on the mental well-being of people nationwide.
SCENARIO FOUR
Russian forces make significant gains along most frontline locations
Kherson city and other communities along the west bank of the Dnipro continue to come under heavy artillery fire as Russian forces eliminate the Ukrainian presence on the east bank by early spring. Russian forces strengthen their defense lines, trenches, and mines along this frontline, preventing Ukraine from making any territorial gains.
With Ukraine failing to mobilize enough manpower, secure enough Western military and financial assistance and construct sufficient defense infrastructure, Russian forces make significant gains in Kharkiv, Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. In Kharkiv Oblast, they take Kupiansk city and much of Kupiansk district, move into the Izyum district and significantly step up their assault on Izyum city, which witnesses heavy fighting.
In Donetsk, Russian forces make gains to the west up to the outskirts of Slovyansk city. Given the fortification strength of Sloviansk, as well as the likely prioritization by Russian forces of Kharkiv Oblast, Russian forces are unable to take Sloviansk. However, the city is subject to increased shelling and attacks from drones and missiles. Along the rest of the Donetsk and Zarorizhzhia frontlines, Russian forces pushes out in pockets, with gains of 10-20 kilometers.
Humanitarian implications
Intensified assaults on Kherson city and neighboring communities deepen the humanitarian crisis. Food security is strained, though market access generally remains possible. However, prices surge as logistical deliveries become less safe. Protection-related risks are amplified and negatively impact the mental well-being of the remaining population, exacerbating issues such as alcoholism, drug abuse, and domestic violence.
Access to communities along the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast deteriorates significantly, complicating operational efforts. The Ukrainian military begins to limit humanitarian access to frontline communities, severely constraining any meaningful aid delivery in areas up to five kilometers from the front line.
In Donetsk Oblast the humanitarian situation deteriorates. Russian forces advance north and west of Donetsk city in the direction of Pokrovsk, and civilian casualties increase. These cities serve as logistical focal points for humanitarian operations, so the proximity of Russian forces increases the risks associated with humanitarian aid delivery. Shifting frontlines fuel displacement from cities such as Kramatorsk and Sloviansk. The number of residents remaining in these two cities had fallen to no more than half of their pre-war populations 150,000 and 100,000 respectively, with several thousand more in the surrounding districts. While many of those remaining will be physically unable to flee, up to 10,000 will leave, mostly in the direction of the cities of Kharkiv and Dnipro, as well as urban settlements along the way to those cities. A smaller number will move further afield in Ukraine or leave the country altogether.
Figure 4. Front line in the vicinity of Donestsk
Kostiantynivka, a city of roughly 70,000 before the full-scale war, has seen similar depopulation since the start of the full-scale war. Another 5,000 to 10,000 would likely flee from there and the surrounding district, following a similar path in the direction of Dnipro and Kharkiv, as would 1,000–5,000 residents of Pokrovsk district. For those choosing to remain, appearing outside is highly risky due to regular shelling from Russian positions that are often only ten kilometers away.
In Kharkiv Oblast, Russian forces breach Ukrainian defense lines in the Kupiansk district. To protect vulnerable populations and children, the authorities enforce evacuations across most of the district. Recent estimates put the population of the district at around 11,000.20 While many of these people are physically unable to flee, a few thousand do make their way to Kharkiv city or other urban areas within the oblast. A few hundred flee to locations further afield in Ukraine. The re-occupation of Kupiansk city and district by Russian forces worsens the already dire humanitarian crisis in the city and district. Mental health and protection needs go unaddressed as the area becomes inaccessible to international and Ukrainian humanitarian aid.
Strikes on Ukraine's critical infrastructure reach new heights, destroying essential facilities providing electricity, heat, and water in many parts of the country, especially in frontline communities where air defense cannot protect them. Warehouses of humanitarian aid are hit. These attacks take a toll on the mental well-being of the Ukrainian people. Meanwhile, the flow of returnees to frontline or previously occupied areas comes to a near complete halt, as Russian forces gain ground, fueling uncertainty and anxiety. Though not comparable to the start of the full-scale war, flows of refugees out of the country notably increase, with 10,000 to 20,000 net departures over the first six months of 2024, including both people from frontline areas and those leaving due to the deteriorating civilian infrastructure in cities across the country. These departures head primarily to Poland and Germany.